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Abstract
Making decisions that factor the cost of time is fundamental to survival. Yet, while it is readily 
appreciated that our perception of time is intimately involved in this process, theories regarding 
intertemporal decision-making and theories regarding time perception are treated, largely, 
independently. Even within these respective domains, models providing good fits to data fail to 
provide insight as to why, from a normative sense, those fits should take their apparent form. 
Conversely, normative models that proffer a rationalization for why an agent should weigh options 
in a particular way, or to perceive time in a particular way, fail to account for the full body of well-
established experimental evidence. Here we review select, yet key advances in our understanding, 
identifying conceptual breakthroughs in the fields of intertemporal decision-making and in time 
perception, as well as their limits and failings in the face of hard-won experimental observation. 
On this background of accrued knowledge, a new conception unifying the domains of decision-
making and time perception is put forward (Training-Integrated Maximization of 
Reinforcement Rate, TIMERR) to provide a better fit to observations and a more parsimonious 
reckoning of why we make choices, and thereby perceive time, the way we do.
1 Introduction
Appreciating the cost of time is central to determining whether an offer of a later but larger 
reward affords a better opportunity than a smaller, but more immediate one. This is often due 
to the fact that the difference in time that must be invested to acquire the larger later reward 
may, potentially, be put to more profitable use. Therefore, when evaluating the relative worth 
of rewarding (or punishing) options, how should the cost of time invested to achieve an 
option’s outcome be weighed? Fields of study as diverse as economics, psychology, ecology, 
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and neuroscience have struggled to measure, and to rationalize, how and why agents factor 
the cost of time the way they do. Below, we summarize prominent theories, their key 
contributions, and their experimentally determined limitations.
2 The problem of choice when factoring time: extant theories
There is a rich history of normative theories—theories that address the question of how 
behavior ought to be—of intertemporal decision making. Samuelson, from the field of 
economics, was the first to formally state how time should be factored in such intertemporal 
decision-making, postulating in his “Discounted Utility Theory” (DUT) the normative 
principle that decision-making should be stationary in time (that is, an option, having been 
determined to be of the greatest value remains so, all else being equal, with the passage of 
time)[1]. Under this constraint, the value of delayed rewards should appear as if discounted 
by an exponential function, with the exponent of discounting controlling its steepness (i.e. 
the agent’s sense of the cost of time, see Table 1). This formulation advanced the notion that 
time has a cost, that its specific form would derive from normative principles, and that it 
could account for observed behaviors. Yet, despite its appeal, experimental observation over 
the following decades would not well accord with this formalism. Rather, observations in 
psychological and behavioral science were largely found to be better fit by a hyperbolic 
form[2] of temporal discounting (wherein stationary time preference can be, and is, 
violated[2–8]).
While hyperbolic discounting provided a better fit to observation, it was from the fields of 
evolutionary biology and ecology that a normative theory rationalizing why agents should 
discount hyperbolically—and with a certain steepness—was forming. Under the principle 
that animals should forage so as to maximize their long-term reward rates[9], Optimal 
Foraging Theory (OFT) arose[10, 11]. When expressed as a discounting function (see Table 
1), the form it takes is hyperbolic. Importantly, whereas the value of the parameter 
controlling the steepness of discounting in prior hyperbolic models lacked biological 
meaning, OFT asserted that this parameter is the reciprocal of the inter-trial interval (of the 
option chosen by the animal to maximize future reward). Though OFT proffered not only a 
normative theory of why temporal discounting should be hyperbolic but also why it should 
have a particular steepness, here too, experimentation was to show that intertemporal 
decision-making did not always abide by its prediction[2, 6, 7, 12–18], namely that agents 
would factor all the temporal delays associated with maximizing a future global reward rate. 
Given this, Ecological Rationality Theory (ERT) was then devised on the basis that animals, 
while seeking to maximize reward rates, factor only the temporal delays to acquire reward, 
arguing that rewards with differing post-reward delays are rarely encountered under natural 
conditions [11, 12] (see Table 1). In this way, the discounting function of ERT is a special 
case of OFT, wherein the post-reward delay—and therefore ERT’s discounting constant—is 
zero. Despite this reformulation, experiments consistently report discounting constants 
greater than zero, inconsistent with ERT [6, 7, 12–18].
The state of the field is then this: while proximate models have been proposed that well-fit 
experimental observations[19–22], as they do not arise from first principles, the meaning 
and/or justification of their terms and form are uncertain. Conversely, theories developed 
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from normative principles, while addressing why a discounting function should take its 
apparent form, fare more poorly in capturing experimental observations. Nonetheless, 
collectively this work has provided deep insight into the problem of intertemporal decision-
making, identifying, formalizing, and framing the issue that time has a cost, that the worth of 
an offer depends on the current state of affairs, and that agents should aim to gather the most 
reward while foraging in an environment. These insights have strong appeal, so what is 
wrong?
3 An experientially-constrained theory of intertemporal decision making: 
Training-Integrated Maximized Estimate of Reward Rate (TIMERR)
Consider an omniscient agent that can foresee the future disposition of reward options 
contingent upon whatever choice path it were to make. Such an agent, for the time it is 
allotted to foraging in an environment, could then determine the choice path that maximizes 
its reward intake over all possible future options. That is truly optimal, yet impossible. A real 
agent is limited in its ability to apprehend the availability of rewards into its future; hence, 
any theory regarding reward rate maximization must be constructed from the perspective of 
what is knowable by the agent. Given that the availability of future reward is unknowable, 
how should an agent evaluate the worth of a reward option, so as to maximize the reward 
acquired during foraging?
To appreciate whether a reward option is worth its cost in time, we have postulated that 
agents look back into their recent past to estimate their rate of experienced reward[23] 
(Figure 1a). An offer of reward is then evaluated by adding the experienced reward rate to 
the offered reward rate as in Figure 1a, and assessing whether the resulting rate of reward 
outstrips the rate that has already been achieved. This construction affords a manner of 
appreciating why some options should be foregone: their selection would needlessly 
decrease the achievable reward rate, as the experienced reward rate foretells of superior 
reward options to come. In the face of multiple offers, it also can determine which is the best 
and by how much. In this way, a reward option is thus evaluated in comparison to the 
estimated worth of the experienced environment as a whole and is the basis of our theory of 
intertemporal decision-making, named so to reflect that postulate: Training-Integrated 
Maximized Estimation of Reinforcement Rate (TIMERR) [23].
TIMERR’s decision-making algorithm can be re-expressed as a statement of an offer’s 
subjective value (Figure 1b), or, as a discounting function (Figure 1c). While all are 
equivalent, these expressions of TIMERR provide additional insights into the consequences 
of TIMERR’s construction. For instance, in a world where one cannot pursue other rewards 
during the delay to a chosen reward, when an offer of reward of a given magnitude, r, and 
delay, d, is expressed in terms of its subjective value (SV[r,t]), it can be seen that an 
opportunity cost (the experienced rate of reward, R/Time, times the delay to the reward, t) is 
subtracted from the offered reward’s magnitude. Therefore, the degree to which an 
environment is rewarding is factored into the decision-making process by subtracting the 
amount of reward that would be expected to be received in lieu of pursuing the offer. The 
richer the reward environment, the less the subjective value of a given offer (and the more 
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discerning the agent appears to be). In a setting where other rewards can indeed be pursued 
during the wait to a chosen option, the opportunity cost lowers to zero, but the hyperbolic 
form remains. By expressing TIMERR as a discounting function (see Figure 1c), it is 
perhaps most readily appreciated that the parameter controlling the steepness of temporal 
discounting is not a free-fit parameter of uncertain meaning (as in DUT and many 
psychological models), but rather is the reciprocal of the time that the agent looks back to 
estimate its experienced reward rate, (1/Time). The longer the agent looks back into its past, 
the greater the subjective value of an offer (and the more patient the agent appears to be). 
Therefore, the time an agent looks back (Time) to estimate its rate of reward, and what that 
experienced reward rate is (R/Time), controls how an offer of a given magnitude and delay is 
evaluated.
The merit of TIMERR rests, of course, on its ability to account for the breadth of well-
established phenomenology in intertemporal decision-making. Key experimental 
observations in intertemporal decision-making are: hyperbolic discounting [2–8], that the 
steepness of discounting varies across individuals and even within individuals in varying 
contexts[2–8, 13, 24], that losses are discounted more steeply the larger the loss[25], that 
there is a differential treatment of losses[3], the Magnitude effect[26–29], the Sign effect[24, 
27, 29], and relatedly, how increasing the size of outcomes diminishes how pronounced the 
Sign effect appears to be[3, 8, 29], when to forgo an option, and the delay-speedup effect[3, 
29]. All of these observations are well-accounted for by TIMERR[23, 30–32]. Notably, and 
in addition, an agent employing the TIMERR decision rule will collect more long-term 
reward rate compared to one employing best fit exponential (DUT), hyperbolic (OFT & 
ERT), or hyperbolic-like (βδ) discounting [23].
4 The perception of time: extant theory and implementation
Above, we have considered how time is factored into decision-making. Since such choices 
require some comprehension of time, perhaps the vagaries of intertemporal decision making 
can be understood as arising from our sense of time? Indeed, it is on this basis that theories 
of temporal perception, in addition to accounting for distinctive features of timing behaviors, 
have been related to intertemporal decision-making. So, how do key theories of time 
perception explain why and/or how time perception expresses the errors? We will treat two 
kinds of errors, one in precision (spread in the temporal estimate) and one in accuracy (how 
close the temporal estimate is to the actual time interval).
Accounts of temporal imprecision
A core experimental observation in time perception is that errors in the precision of time 
perception are largely found to scale in proportion to the interval being timed. Leading 
theories of time perception[33–36] provide a framework as to how this oft observed 
characteristic[37–39], termed the “scalar timing property”, may come about. Scalar 
Expectancy Theory (SET) [36, 38] accounts for the temporal scalar property by asserting 
that a comparator operates on a ratio-rule in assessing whether the accumulation of a 
pacemaker matches a remembered interval. When the interval to be timed is the delay to a 
reinforcement, Behavioral Theory of Timing (BeT) can account for the scalar property by 
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assuming that the rate of accumulation is inversely proportional to the rate of reinforcement 
(being the inverse of the delay to reward)[35]. These and related models of time perception 
[14, 33, 40–42] make connection to intertemporal decision-making in that they offer a 
rationale as to why agents may exhibit non-stationary time preferences: as two reward 
options separated by a given delay lie further into the future, their perceived delays 
increasingly approximate one another, leading to an increased likelihood of selecting the 
later, but larger, option. But, while these theories describe processes that would lead to scalar 
timing and, potentially, non-stationary time preferences, they don’t address why errors in 
timing should exhibit their observed relationship to the interval being timed.
Providing a proximate answer to this issue, it has been proposed that imprecision in timing 
may arise due simply to noise introduced by neural processing. Though a simple pacemaker-
accumulator model that assumes Poisson-spiking of a single neuron can be constructed that 
produces the scalar timing property (mathematically mimicking BeT), a drift-diffusion 
model of timing comprised of a network of Poisson neurons provides a more biologically 
feasible account[43]. In this “Time-adaptive, opponent DDM” (TopDDM) model, it is 
assumed that two opponent Poisson processes (one excitatory and the other inhibitory) 
linearly sum to produce drift in the accumulator[44]. By this means, accumulation to a target 
threshold at rates tuned to the interval to be timed is shown to abide by the temporal scalar 
property. The above theories and implementation models posit how scalar timing comes 
about, and may thus offer a rationale as to why non-stationary time preference could be 
observed as imprecise perception at long delays might bias choices towards larger, later 
rewards. However, recent experimental observations [45, 46] run counter to the scalar timing 
account of non-stationary time preference. By its reckoning, improved time perception 
should result in reduced tolerance to delay; yet, improved time perception is correlated with 
a greater delay tolerance[45, 46]. Therefore, scalar timing is likely not the basis of non-
stationary time preferences.
Accounts of temporal accuracy
In addition to the imprecision in timing, the accuracy of timing is yet another defining 
feature. Does subjective time (defined as the neuronal metric of the passage of time) 
accurately reflect objective time? Addressing this question requires a direct measure of 
subjective time and is thus, extremely difficult. However, psychologists attempt to infer the 
subjective representation of time by observing patterns in particular timing behaviors. To 
assess what form subjective time takes, the method of temporal bisection [47–49] is often 
used to determine the point of subjective equality (PSE) between two temporal intervals (ie, 
the intermediate interval equally mistaken as being short or long). Asserting that subjective 
time is linear, SET predicts that the PSE should be the geometric mean, which is consistent 
with many experimental observations [47, 50]. Yet, surveying temporal bisection 
experiments [48, 51, 52], the PSE can be found to range from the harmonic mean of the 
reference intervals to the arithmetic mean. This may either be because 1) the subjective 
representation of time is linear but the comparison of two intervals is performed by 
comparing their ratio against a standard (e.g. unity ratio within a measurement error implies 
equal intervals) or some other non-linear operation, or, 2) because the subjective 
representation of time itself is non-linear with the comparison of two intervals performed by 
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comparing their difference (e.g. zero difference within a measurement error implies equal 
intervals). Therefore, while the form of subjective time can accord with objective time 
(under a ratio read-out rule), it also could deviate from objective time, apparently as some 
nonlinear, concave function[42]. Indeed, should subjective time be logarithmic, exponential 
temporal discounting in subjective time would then appear as hyperbolic, explaining non-
stationary time preference as well as the scalar property[42, 53]. Nevertheless, these theories 
and implementation models do not speak to the purpose of why subjective time should take 
the form that it does, nor how or why the curvature of that form may, or should, change.
5 TIMERR and its reckoning of time perception
Postulating that the subjective reward rate of an option should reflect the change in objective 
reward rate it offers, we have recently derived, using TIMERR’s framework, an expression 
for the subjective representation of time (figure 1d1)[30–32]. This rationalizes why the 
representation of subjective time takes the form it does: so that the subjective reward rate 
accurately represents the change in objective reward rate. The key feature of representing 
subjective time in such a way is that it is a bounded, nonlinear concave function whose 
curvature is controlled, crucially, by Time (the past integration integral over which the animal 
estimates its experienced reward rate). In this way, TIMERR is able to account for the 
varying forms subjective time has been inferred to have through the method of temporal 
bisection. When the past integration interval becomes increasing large, the degree of 
nonlinearity between objective time and the subjective representation of time becomes 
diminishingly small, resulting in the PSE approaching the arithmetic mean of the reference 
intervals. As the past integration interval decreases, this non-linearity increases such that the 
PSE will come to accord with the geometric mean. Further decreasing the past integration 
interval toward zero results in this nonlinearity approaching its maximum, causing the PSE 
to approach the harmonic mean. Hence, TIMERR can reconcile divergent experimental 
observations regarding the form of subjective time, while addressing what purpose its form 
serves, but what of subjective time’s imprecision?
An implementation-level model of TIMERR that provides a mechanistic account of time 
perception and production is a drift-diffusion model (TIMERR-DDM), that assumes, like 
TopDDM, neurons that function as Poisson accumulators[30]. Poisson processes, by their 
very nature, produce errors that scale with the square root of their magnitude. How then do 
such accumulators result in timing errors that grow linearly with time? While TopDDM 
solves this problem by assuming that the accumulation is to a constant threshold with its rate 
tuned to be inversely proportional to the interval to be timed, TIMERR-DDM proposes a 
recurrent feedback onto the accumulator so as to represent the non-linear subjective time 
mentioned above. The TIMERR-DDM network accumulator model can produce near scalar 
invariance in timing[30], but importantly, also predicts, under certain conditions, systematic 
deviations from scalar timing, as have been observed experimentally [54, 55]. A defining 
feature of TIMERR-DDM is that the rate of integration is inversely proportional to the 
interval the agent looks back to estimate the rate of reward, Time, which controls this non-
linearity in the accumulator. The distinctive prediction of TopDDM is that the ratio of 
skewness to CV of produced time intervals is exactly 3 [44]. Interestingly, while this 
distinguishes TopDDM from other accumulator models [30], TIMERR DDM makes very 
Namboodiri and Shuler Page 6





















similar predictions. However, TIMERR-DDM makes additional falsifiable predictions. The 
most important such prediction is that the non-linearity of time perception will be tuned to 
be optimal for an interval to be timed. Since TIMERR predicts that the non-linearity of time 
perception is also tied to the rate of temporal discounting, this prediction implies that 
optimal timing of intervals will affect temporal discounting. This has not yet been 
appropriately tested, but it is known that there is strong correlation between temporal 
discounting and time perception, such that the greater the tolerance to delay, the greater the 
ability to perceive time[45, 46, 56, 57].
Summary
Why has the hunt for the perfect discounting function and a reckoning of time perception 
been so elusive? The accretion of thought and observation surveyed above argues that, with 
regards to intertemporal decision-making, evolutionarily motivated normative principles 
should underpin the decision-making process while being limited by what is knowable to the 
agent. In this light, TIMERR is a next step in rationalizing why temporal discounting takes 
its apparent form: so as to maximize reward rate within experiential constraints. From this 
perspective, error in subjective time can also then be understood as taking the form that it 
does in the service of maximizing reward rate, rather than simply being nature’s 
impoverished attempt at representing time as it is.
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• Intertemporal decision-making is not well-accounted for by prior 
normative theories
• Prior theories of timing consider the perception of time to be 
independent of intertemporal decision-making
• A new reward-rate maximizing theory (TIMERR) rationalizes 
observations in intertemporal decision-making & time perception
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A) The TIMERR decision-making algorithm (right) can be depicted graphically (left) so as 
to visualize how offers of given reward sizes (r) and delays (t) are evaluated. An agent (filled 
orange circle), by looking into its past over an interval Time, assesses the rewards 
accumulated (R), thereby appreciating the reward rate experienced in the environment up to 
that moment. The local reward rates associated with current offers of future reward (slopes 
of red and blue offers) are then added to the experienced reward rate so as to calculate 
respective reward rates that could be achieved, were the agent to pursue an offer.
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B) The TIMERR decision-making algorithm can be used to derive an expression for the 
subjective value of an offer, by equating an immediate offer of reward with a delayed offer 
of greater size but which yields the same achievable reward rate. By rearranging for 
subjective value, it is then appreciated that the opportunity cost of time (R/Time* t) is 
subtracted from a reward option (right inset). Graphically, the subjective value of a delayed 
reward is the y-intercept “now” in time of the line depicting the achievable reward rate were 
the agent to pursue that reward option (left).
C) The TIMERR decision-making algorithm can also be re-expressed as a temporal 
discounting function in terms of the fraction of an offer’s magnitude as a function of time 
(inset). The discounting function can be visualized by re-plotting the subjective value of a 
reward that is delayed through time at the offered reward’s respective delay (left). The 
resulting function is hyperbolic.
D) The form of subjective time under TIMERR. D1) TIMERR postulates that the subjective 
reward rate of an offer should equal the difference between the local reward rate of an offer 
and the experienced reward rate. D2) Subjective representation of time (ST(t)) is then found 
by replacing the subjective value of a delayed reward of magnitude r and delay t, SV(r,t), 
with its equation in B, and solving for ST(t). D3) We hypothesize that the neural 
representation of time is ST(t) normalized by Time, as shown in the y-axis. This neural 
representation of subjective time yields a bounded, concave function from 0 (corresponding 
to zero delay) to 1 (corresponding to infinite delay). The smaller the past integration interval 
(Time), the more non-linear the neural representation of time (as visualized in D3).
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